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In 2008, research into the Great Chinese Famine of 1958-1962 entereda decisive new phase. Adopting the direction first taken by Becker, itturned its main focus to the local effects of the famine, the behaviour
of officials, and the attempts of the starving to survive. (1) Eating Bitterness,
which is the outcome of a collaboration between researchers from the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC), Canada, the United States, and Austria, a
number of whom had access to local archives or conducted patient inter-
views, belongs firmly to this new current, as emphasised, for example, by
the excellent introduction by the two editors. Espousing greater prudence
than Dikötter, they stand by previous estimates of the total number of
deaths resulting from the famine, which range from 15 to 43 million. Unlike
him, they do not disregard the demographic and economic context, and
they recall (p. 3) the number and scale of famines that hit China between
1876 and 1943.
The first half of the book is confined to historiographical, ideological, and
literary discussions. Suzanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik illustrates how the his-
toriography of the Great Leap has gradually moved away from the ortho-
dox view, the interpretation shifting from that of a “tragedy of good
intentions” (Li Rui) to that of the utopia and vices of the political system
(Zhang Letian), then to recognition of the contradictory interests of the
peasants and the state as highlighted by Gao Wangling, who portrays the
famine as a turning point in relations between the two. It is the work of
writers (Wang Zhiliang, Yu Hua, Mo Yan, etc.) rather than that of historians,
memorialists, and essay writers that revealed the horror of the famine and
the “peasant resistance.” However, writers in favour with the authorities
hastened to raise a “screen of ignorance.” As early as January 1959, the in-
evitable Hao Ran published an edifying short story on love among the rural
blast furnaces, in spite of the fact that he had previously been informed of
the ineptitude and lies of the Great Leap. This has been demonstrated by
Richard King (p. 66), who has also analysed a more popular and less
schematic story, “A Brief Biography of Li Shuangshuang” (by Li Zhun), in
which the heroine transforms the revolting food of the canteens into
mouth-watering fare. She also accomplishes a hundred other exploits, as
glorified in a film made in 1962, but the canteens, which had long since
closed, did not feature in the script. (2) The Great Leap Forward gave women
activists the opportunity to prove that they carried the same worth as
men. As Kimberley Ens Manning has shown, this forced the retreat of a
more classical Marxist conception, which favoured sexual equality and
showed concern for women’s health, and instead favoured Maoist produc-
tivism, which resisted the idea of women taking rest at the end of preg-
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nancy and after giving birth on the basis that this amounted to a refusal
to make the sacrifices required of each person in order to further the rev-
olution. The war on nature was compounded by violence inflicted on the
body, as physiological constraints and natural obstacles add up to part of
the same battle. Taking this line of thought further, the grain problem was
an ideological problem (sixiang wenti), according to the prevailing view in
autumn 1957 during the Socialist Education Campaign, the rural embodi-
ment of the Anti-Rightist Campaign. Having a good social background no
longer offered protection to a peasant who claimed hunger in an attempt
to hand over less grain to the state, or indeed to request assistance; such
behaviour was seen to represent a selfish, capitalist attitude and was se-
verely punished in the autumn of 1957. The result of this was that one or
two years down the line, when the country was in the grip of famine, no-
body dared complain of hunger for fear of being branded anti-socialist. In
this respect at least, the measures taken by the Centre proved effective:
over the two-year period from 1959 to 1960, the total number of food
shortage cases reported to high-ranking officials in the Neibu cankao was
lower than that of 1957 alone! In the simple words of Felix Wemheuer,
“Discourses can sometimes have deadly consequences” (p. 127).
The following contributions from Chinese researchers bring us to the
famine proper. Describing the first eight months of the people’s com-
munes (August 1958-April 1959) in Macheng (Hubei), Wang Yanni con-
cludes that the aim of the communes was not so much to impose
communism as to mobilise the rural workforce and convert it into a mas-
sive industrial army. In Macheng, as in other places cited in Dikötter’s ac-
count (Chapter 20), a period of frenzied destruction preceded the
construction work. Fifty-four thousand houses were demolished in the
xian in order to transform the walls into fertilizer and increase the pro-
ductivity of the workers, who were gathered in one place while also being
separated, with men in one dormitory, women in another, and children
elsewhere. The more fortunate remained in their own homes, which were
not demolished, but they were required to accommodate five more fam-
ilies, meaning 35 people would be squeezed into a house designed for six
or seven. Many others were recruited into veritable “armies of production”
(pp. 162-163), often spending more time walking to distant places of work
than actually working, at a time when there was a shortage of manpower
to cultivate the collective fields and feed the blast furnaces. In addition
to production, consumption was another issue of such significance that
some authors consider the collective canteens to be one of the main
causes of the famine. (3) Xin Yi illustrates how the distribution system was
continuously evolving in the people’s communes as a result of political
developments and above all necessity. After two or three months, the ini-
tial ideal of free distribution of food, clothes, housing, etc., was wearing
thin, and with reserves running out, there was a shift to a mixed system
combining distribution “according to need” and a salary proportional to
the work performed. Just after the Lushan Conference, the campaign
against Right-deviation gave a new boost to the canteens, and by the end
of 1959, they were feeding 400 million people, more than 70% of the
population of the people’s communes (and nearly 98% of those in Henan,
one of the provinces worst hit by the famine). The mixed system did not
survive the worst of the famine in 1960, when it became necessary to dis-
tribute what meagre supplies there were on the basis of work performed,
removing the last vestiges of the egalitarianism that had been imposed
two years earlier. There was so little to share out that the authorities pro-
moted and sang the praises of food substitutes (daishipin), which are the
focus of Gao Hua’s contribution. Under the heading “natural substitutes”
(plants and animals), pride of place went not to a species of insect, nor to
rats or field mice, tree bark, fruit cores, stems, leaves, or roots, but to
chlorella, a seaweed that Shanghai started to feed to pigs during the first
half of 1960. By the end of July, 27 provinces were growing it to feed their
human populations. Diluted in a small amount of urine, it was even more
nourishing. At the end of 1960, the Propaganda Department was giving
food substitutes a “nutritional value… even greater than that of real grain”
(p. 188). The result of this was that many people contracted food poison-
ing, and some workers grumbled: “This is chicken food, and even chickens
wouldn’t eat it.” Those who felt nostalgic ironically commented: “(Life in
the new society) is…not as good as working as a hired-hand for a landlord,
… (it) is certainly nowhere near as good as it was for pigs and dogs back
then” (p. 190).
Words were one way of letting off steam, but in order to survive, action
was necessary – in particular non-violent action, since the slightest hint
of revolt would be met with immediate condemnation by the repressive
forces of the regime. As a former zhiqing sent to the countryside, Gao
Wangling covered five provinces over a period of nearly a decade spent
investigating a thousand-and-one ways of “snatching food from the tiger’s
mouth” (p. 285). Some required the collusion of officials, for example to
conceal a portion of the production, which would then be redistributed
among members of the team or, more rarely, the brigade, a practice
brought to light by Jean Oi in 1989. (4) The collusion of officials was also
necessary for the seven or eight ways in which accounts were falsified
(listed on p. 283), but they would have been unaware of the practice of
leaving part of the harvest behind in order to retrieve it after nightfall.
While major thefts (da tou) remained the exception rather than the rule,
instances of small-time theft were common, and around a hundred jin of
grain would be diverted from the collective sector in order to keep one’s
family alive over the course of a year. More substantial thieving took place
at night as harvest time approached, the effectiveness of the nocturnal
patrols being compromised by the fact that a guard one night could turn
thief the next, and vice versa. Gao Wangling does not linger long on a sur-
vival strategy that is central to the contribution of Ralph Thaxton, as seen,
for example, in the monograph that he dedicates to a village in Henan
during and after the famine. (5) This involved surreptitiously eating still-
green crops (chiqing) off the plants before they grew ripe for harvesting.
In Thaxton’s view, this survival strategy, which was very widespread in
some places (up to 70% of future harvests were eaten before they reached
maturity in seven of the production brigades in Shandong, p. 263), was
often the most effective form of peasant resistance, and was responsible
for bringing about the end of the famine, an achievement that is usually
attributed to the reforming majority of the leading oligarchy once it finally
became aware of the scale of the disaster (I share the common opinion).
Ralph Thaxton has moved on a great deal since publishing his first book (6)
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without abandoning the romanticism that makes him magnify the peas-
ant resistance. As a widespread survival strategy during periods of
famine, (7) chiqing can extend the life of the pilferer – more so than that
of his offspring, since children younger than six years of age cannot digest
unripe cereals – before it reduces harvests and rations a few weeks or
months later. It was a desperate individual initiative, like so many others
at a time when the harshness of the famine meant peasants were less and
less able to fight collectively. On the contrary, the famine pushed some
to kill and eat their neighbours (or even their own children), and others,
in greater numbers, to lynch adolescents guilty of having stolen a handful
of rice. Gao Wangling’s more guarded and exhaustive contribution makes
a list of “acts of opposition” (fanxingwei) without framing them as a re-
sistance movement. If I had had access to this impressive catalogue a
decade ago, it would have enabled me to massively expand my description
of the “weapons of the weak.” That said, I would not have changed my
assessment of this litany of “everyday forms of resistance:” (8) Gao paints
a familiar picture with an impressive wealth of detail. Thaxton is not the
only contributor who can give the impression (Susanne Weigelin-
Schwiedrzik p. 47, and less distinctly, the editors on pages 14 and 19 of
the introduction) of idealising the desperate actions for survival (9) or of
revealing the obvious, for example, the conflict between the interests of
the peasants and those of a modernising state that was determined, from
the outset, to finance “primitive accumulation” at the expense of the ex-
ploited peasant majority; so much was recommended by Preobrajenski’s
model as far back as 1925.
The regional inequalities that arose during the famine are tackled in two
very interesting contributions. First, Jeremy Brown’s chapter about Tianjin
covers the gulf between town and countryside. People were starving to
death in Tianjin by 1961, but it was a paradise compared to the rural xian
of the municipality (map, p. 233), which were themselves less afflicted
than neighbouring Shandong. The first secretary of the CCP of Tianjin often
visited the villages and received daily reports of deaths caused by starva-
tion, attacks on grain stores, and diseases caused by famine. For example,
28,000 peasants were poisoned as a result of eating earth, roots, and other
daishipin. Each day, villagers poured in by train, ticketless, with 176,000
arriving illegally during the first quarter of 1960. Some of those who fell
to the ground would  never stand up again. The city dwellers were quite
aware of the fact that many villagers were looting suburban grain ware-
houses (nine times in three days in one particular locality), while others
were taken in and fed by city-dwelling relatives. While the Tianjin author-
ities were concerned about the fate of the country people, their absolute
priority was the survival of the city dwellers. But it went further than that:
when it transpired that the city lacked the provisions necessary to cele-
brate the New Year in 1959, the Grain Director of Tianjin visited Shandong
to request assistance. Arriving in Jinan, he came face to face with a Beijing
colleague who was visiting on a similar mission. Each left with a cargo of
wheat, cabbage, broad beans, onions, and ginger, all supplied by the vic-
tims of the famine for their less threatened city-dwelling counterparts.
By the end of the following year, the situation was even more strained:
Tianjin was down to no more than three days’ worth of reserves, forcing
the Director of Commerce to inform the central leadership. Only then,
with the crisis reaching Tianjin and other large cities, did the Centre take
the decision to import grain from Australia and Canada, even though it
had been receiving accurate reports of rural deaths caused by the famine
for the past year.
1% of deaths in Jiangxi, 18% in Anhui
It has long been known that the famine struck in a very uneven manner,
not only with regard to urban and rural areas, but also in terms of
provinces and regions. Those furthest to the north, such as Heilongjiang,
Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Shaanxi, suffered less than most; conversely,
Anhui, Henan, Sichuan, Gansu, and Guizhou were among the worst hit.
Theories abound as to what caused these disparities, including the spread
of collective canteens, the predominance of agriculture, and the poverty
of the province in question (in order to protect city dwellers and workers,
the industrial provinces were not required to export as much grain to the
other provinces), the level of radicalism of provincial leaders, etc. In what
I believe to be the best chapter in the book, Chen Yixin compares the two
adjoining provinces of Jiangxi and Anhui, the first of which registered a
surplus of 180,000 deaths (1.06% of its population), the latter 6,330,000
(18.37% of the provincial population) between 1958 and 1961. Moreover,
Jiangxi took in half a million refugees, mainly from Anhui, most of whom
survived. The natural conditions were far more favourable in Jiangxi, which
had a lower population density in 1957 of 18.5 million inhabitants over
an area of 64,000 sq. mi., compared to the 33.3 million inhabitants of
Anhui’s 54,000 sq. mi. (one quarter the size of France). Jiangxi also boasted
more fertile and better-watered land; 70% of its farmed area was irrigated
by the 1950s, whereas as late as the 1980s, only 40% of the farmed area
of Anhui was similarly provided. In 1949, 150 kg of grain was being har-
vested per mu in Jiangxi, compared to 63 kg in Anhui. Poyang Lake, today
a puddle by comparison, was at that time the largest body of fresh water
in China, its fish providing nearby inhabitants with the food they needed
to survive. Forests, where edible plants and animals could be found, cov-
ered 40% of the area of Jiangxi, as opposed to 12.5% of Anhui. In the
northern part of Anhui, where 49% of the population was squeezed into
36% of the province, the disadvantage was even more pronounced, with
forests accounting for only 0.1% of the land. For centuries, Jiangxi had
made major tax contributions to the imperial coffers, while Anhui was
hardly able to keep its population fed. 
Taxation also helps explain the contrast (1% compared to 18% of deaths
caused by famine) that the natural conditions began to reflect. The rate of
tax in kind was lower in the old revolutionary bases, which abounded in
Jiangxi. State farms, which had opened in order to develop wooded hills and
mountains, marshes, and swamplands, were exempt from paying tax for one
to three years; Jiangxi boasted many such establishments, while they were
almost non-existent in Anhui. Figures reflecting the food supply remaining
after the payment of tax and compulsory deductions (grain sold to the state
at a low price) speak for themselves, showing a drop from 5.2 million tons
in 1957 to 4.3 million tons in 1959 in Jiangxi, compared to 7.3 million tons
to 4.3 million tons over the same period in Anhui. In 1959, the two provinces
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therefore had the same amount of grain, but one had 18 million mouths to
feed, and the other 33 million.
Finally, and above all, this contrast reflects the unequal zeal exercised by
provincial leaders when it came to urging the requisitioning of food and
pursuing the various radical projects close to the heart of Mao. The First
Secretary of the CP of Anhui, Zeng Xisheng, was friendly with Mao and
boasted a revolutionary pedigree (geming zige) far greater than that of the
other leaders in the province, whom he showed no hesitation in dismissing.
He mobilised large workforces for major projects, as exemplified at the Cen-
tral Committee Conference of November and December 1958, when he in-
creased by eightfold the volume of stone and earth he would be able to
move in the province over the course of a few days. A few months later,
more than five million farmers toiling on the irrigation projects were sorely
missed in the collective fields, which had been left with only 44% of the
province’s agricultural workforce. Unlike the Hunan-born Zeng in Anhui, the
four main leaders in Jiangxi were all born in the province, and joined the
Soviets of Jiangxi at the end of the 1920s. The first secretary of the provincial
CP, Yang Shangkui, formed a close-knit team with his lieutenants. At the be-
ginning of 1958, the quartet undertook to increase agricultural production
by 80%, an impossible task (Anhui meanwhile promised an increase of
150%), but when things took a turn for the worse, they endeavoured to
keep the damage to a minimum by transporting rice to regions that were
suffering shortages. Zeng never visited the countryside, and turned a deaf
ear when his colleagues informed him of the xian hit by the famine. He did
order inspections, but only with the purpose of discovering grain hidden
away in rural homes. (10) Chen Yixin suggests extending this analysis to other
provinces, for example Sichuan, which was blessed with natural resources
but led by Li Jingquan, who was, like Zeng, originally from a different
province (Jiangxi) to that which he governed so tyrannically.
Two researchers from Hong Kong estimate that the ideology of a provin-
cial leader counted for less than his career-driven calculations. (11) At the
time of the Great Leap, provincial first secretaries who were full members
of the Central Committee had no more prospects of promotion to look for-
ward to, as the few members of the Political Bureau who had not taken part
in the Long March had many years of guerrilla warfare behind them, making
them practically irremovable (the Cultural Revolution would change this).
Meanwhile, becoming a full member of the Central Committee was a natural
ambition for a deputy member. Comparing 24 provinces (excluding Tibet,
Xinjiang, and the three municipalities), the authors calculate that deputy
members removed and then exported more grain to other provinces and
undertook more major projects in irrigation and other areas. They therefore
attribute a proportion of the excess mortality to the policies of provincial
first secretaries who were deputy members of the Central Committee (al-
though Zeng Xisheng and other radicals were already full members). I am
less convinced by the quantitative results obtained by these two authors
than by their conclusion that the majority of the provincial leaders who
proved their “Maoist” zeal during the Great Leap acted less out of conviction
than out of careerism.
Mubei in French
Eating Bitterness is a substantial new work that approaches the subject
from all angles, as is quite often the case in multi-authored books. Even for
readers of this journal who already have certain knowledge of the famine,
it is no bad thing that the introduction to the book provides a very clear re-
minder of anything they may have forgotten, as well as a good many evoca-
tive insights. It does not neglect to introduce and praise (p. 13) Yang Jisheng’s
comprehensive survey, which is the bible in terms of famine during the Great
Leap, and in honour of which Xu Youyu wrote a deserved homage in China
Perspectives (No. 2009/1, pp. 98-101). The recent French translation, which
is cited above, note 1, condenses the entire first volume of Mubei into five
chapters. Four of these (6-9) are dedicated to the provinces that were hit
hardest: Henan, Anhui, Sichuan, and Gansu. Chapter 10 provides a brief
overview of the famine in various other provinces. The choice is sound, be-
cause the uninformed Western reader otherwise runs the risk of becoming
bogged down in a repetitive abundance of details with which to measure
the scale of the disaster first in one locality or province and then another.
This is the inevitable price to be paid for one of the great strengths of the
study, by far the most comprehensive ever written about a famine that has
long been brushed under the carpet. The less condensed second volume of
Mubei is therefore spread over the first five chapters of the French edition
and the last six (11-16), which makes it possible to highlight Yang Jisheng’s
more general considerations, which are damning of Mao and the regime. 
I will only mention a few of them here, taken from various points in the
book, in particular from the final chapter, which is given over to the impact
of the famine on subsequent political development (pp. 591-615 and pp.
659-61 of the French edition, pp. 999-1038 of Mubei, which gives an idea
of the respective sizes of the two versions). The famine had barely been
brought under control (in 1962) before splits began to appear. Between the
“Conference of 7,000,” where Liu Shaoqi stated the obvious (that the ca-
tastrophe was due to human error much more than to nature), and his sum-
moning six months later by Mao – next to his swimming pool! – the gulf
began to widen between the two main leaders. When the President of the
People’s Republic responded to the Party President’s accusation that he was
painting a black picture by saying: “History will record the role you and I
played in the starvation of so many people, and the cannibalism will also
be memorialized!”, he was perhaps sealing his fate. Mao’s reply, “What will
happen after I die?”, can actually be interpreted both as a reference to the
original Soviet revolution (“you intend to knock me down, as Khrushchev
did Stalin?”) and as a sinister omen of the Cultural Revolution.
Even if Liu Shaoqi’s independence – a consequence of the famine, it should
be remembered – was to prove fatal to him, it was almost as fainthearted
as it was belated, and as late as 1962, he was still publicly getting on Mao’s
hobby horse. Despite being a victim of the dictator, the fact remains that
Liu had reason to fear that History would not absolve him, since the deaths
caused by hunger, cannibalism, and so on were also his responsibility and
that of the rest of the Party’s leaders as well. Nearly all of them behaved
like subjugated vassals, from those who exaggerated this with obsequious-
ness (Zhou Enlai) or sycophancy (Lin Biao) to Chen Yun, one of the very few
to have expressed reservations about the Great Leap strategy from the out-
set. Chen would move himself to the sidelines, if necessary citing poor
health, when his lucidity no longer served any purpose, or in other words,
when his thinking ran contrary to that of the Great Helmsman. He would
then issue the required self-criticism, and if this was considered (by Mao)
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to be unsatisfactory, he would follow it up with lavish praise for the Presi-
dent. My intention is not to criticise Chen in particular (without having ex-
perienced the yoke of totalitarianism, there is no way of knowing how one
might have behaved in his shoes), but to demonstrate how everyone kept
their counsel – or was even approving – in the face of things of which they
disapproved. Can we blame them, when the effects of courage have been
measured in millions of deaths (Peng Dehuai at Lushan)?
Having dealt with the moral and psychological considerations, (12) we are
taken back to the essence of the regime, and not only from the Chinese
copy to the Soviet original, but from Stalinist practices to the inexorable
development of the Leninist matrix, as predicted by Trotsky and Rosa Lux-
emburg a year after What Is To Be Done was published. This started with
the absolute power wielded by Stalin and Mao, sole holders of the truth, or
to put it more accurately, the only exegetes authorised with the coded Truth.
This led to the boomerang effect caused by the impossible demands of the
leaders, which forced local officials to lie or to delay the sending of watered-
down reports to the Central Committee for months, to the point that Mao
and other leaders could not hope to react until the problems had already
become almost intractable. There was also the role of scapegoat that fell
to these same officials, working with a Sword of Damocles over their heads
and punished either for having balked at applying unsuitable measures, or
(later, in 1961-62, when it was no longer possible to deny the extent of the
famine) for having executed their orders. Finally, this was a particular style
of meritocracy in which conformism and docility were unspoken selection
criteria.
Communist famines: China and the USSR
Taking the relationship between the two “brother” regimes as a pretext, I
attempt to draw a succinct comparison between the Chinese and Soviet
famines. This does not apply to all the Soviet famines, since those of 1921-
22 and 1946-47 are intertwined with the World Wars which preceded them,
and with civil war, typhus, and other epidemics in the case of the former. It
is instead restricted to those famines that occurred in times of peace, i.e.,
in 1958 and 1962 in China and in 1931 and 1933 in the USSR. A first famine
killed a good quarter of the population of Kazakhstan in 1931, while the
famine that struck the Ukraine, North Caucasus, and southern Russia killed
six million people in 1932 and especially in 1933. This is not the world record
– that belongs to the Chinese famine – but it was the biggest European
famine of the twentieth century. (13) In China and the USSR alike, the same
development strategy resulted in excessive transfers from farming to heavy
industry. Spurred on by the leader, the strategy increased in pace, with Stalin
imposing the Great Break and Mao the Great Leap. The requisition of grain
meant peasants went hungry, the nature and operation of the regime trans-
formed these requisitions into ruthless extortion, and the extreme hierar-
chical organisation prevented any questioning of the ukases of the two
dictators. Both in the USSR and in China, the requisitions continued even
when the famine had become a recognised fact. However, it was not recog-
nised in the eyes of everyone, for a comparable denial of famine took hold
in both countries. For example, Edouard Herriot praised the luxuriance of
the Ukrainian kolkhozes he was shown in 1933. In Ukraine, and later China,
runaways who were intercepted in stations and on the roads were sent back
home. Also in Ukraine, and subsequently China, the famine accelerated sud-
denly. Its revival in autumn 1959 after the Lushan Conference mirrored the
“death blow” (Sokoloff) of summer 1932, although not the final death blow
of autumn 1932 and winter 1932-33, when it is possible that Stalin, now
seeing the Ukrainian peasants as the main vectors of separatist nationalism,
deliberately left them to die or killed them. There was no such intentionality
in Mao’s decisions, but rather inconsistency and an inability to recognise
barely imaginable faults. Ultimately, the speed and adequacy with which
assistance was provided to the victims was barely better in China than in
the USSR. Also, in both cases city dwellers were favoured over their rural
counterparts. While they did not attain the same level of cruelty as Stalin,
his Chinese disciples went further than their predecessors when it came to
lying, which is no mean feat, judging from Mandelstam’s stanzas or the 
imprecations of Solzhenitsyn. Lying and the corruption of minds – of the
Communists and of the guinea pigs themselves – was rampant and unin-
terrupted all the way from Leningrad (and Warsaw or Prague: see Milosz or
Havel) to Guangzhou. The fact remains that the absolute record in terms of
yield ever recorded in the history of humanity is held not by the USSR but
by China: more than 70 tonnes of rice harvested over 710 m2, or 396 tonnes
per acre. (14) If we make an exception of this record attributed to Guangxi, a
province that was, after all, well placed in terms of the mortality rates
reached between 1958 and 1962, there is a fairly general correlation to be
seen between the most barefaced lies and the most numerous deaths from
hunger (Anhui, Henan, etc.). There is nothing surprising in this, since claims
of outrageous levels of production would justify deadly requisitions.
There are also many other differences, starting with the unusually long
duration of the famine in China, compared to Ukraine and North Caucasus,
where it was at its worst for no more than five months (from March to July
1933). The real contrast lies in the objective conditions that prevailed in
China. Whether in terms of the causes of the famine or the reaction to it,
Stalin’s responsibility is at least as overwhelming as that of Mao, while that
of his accomplices (Molotov or Kaganovitch, for example) was greater than
that of Mao’s docile lieutenants. Why, then, were the effects of the famine
nevertheless more disastrous for China? Part of the reason lies in the fact
that in ordinary times (before the famine) China, as an overpopulated coun-
try, lived or subsisted closer to limits that were impossible to reduce further:
307 kg of grain was available per inhabitant in 1956, a record that lasted
from the start of the regime until it was equalled and bettered for the first
time in 1975 (308 kg), just before Mao’s death, which finally opened the
N o . 2 0 1 3 / 3  •  c h i n a  p e r s p e c t i v e s 89
12. On this point, see Jean-Luc Domenach, Mao, sa cour et ses complots. Derrière les Murs rouges
(Mao, his court and its plots: Behind the red walls), Paris, Fayard, 2012. The most generous expla-
nation offered by Domenach on these ascetics who had become prosperous, privileged family
men, whose families would be doomed to eternal disgrace if they dared confront the supreme
power, is that no one wanted to take the risk of causing the fall of the regime that incarnated the
dream of their youth and their life’s work: “my party right or wrong,” or as Trotsky had already
and ill-advisedly said: none of us can be right against the Party. 
13. Concerning the famine in Kazakhstan, see Isabelle Ohayon, La sédentarisation des Kazakhs dans
l’URSS de Staline: Collectivisation et changement social (1928-1945) (The Settlement of the
Kazakh in Stalin’s USSR: Collectivisation and social change [1928-1945]), Bibliothèque d’Asie Cen-
trale, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2006. Concerning the famine in the Ukraine, North Caucasus,
the southern Volga, western Siberia, and central Russia, reading includes: Alain Blum, Naître, vivre
et mourir en URSS (To be born, to live and to die in the USSR), Petite Bibliothèque Payot (original
edition: Plon, 1994); R. W. Davies and Stephen Wheatcroft, The years of hunger: Soviet agriculture,
1931-1933, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004; Andrea Graziozi, “Les famines soviétiques de
1931-33 et le Holodomor ukrainien: une nouvelle interprétation est-elle possible et quelles en
seraient les conséquences?” (The Soviet Famines of 1931-33 and the Ukrainian Holodomor: Is a
new interpretation possible and what would be its consequences?), Cahiers du Monde Russe et
Soviétique, Vol. 46, No. 3, 2005, pp. 453-72; Georges Sokoloff, 1933, l’année noire. Témoignages
sur la famine en Ukraine (The dark days of 1933: Testimonies on hunger in Ukraine), Paris, Albin
Michel, 2000; Viola, Lynne, “La famine de 1932-1933 en Union soviétique” (The Famine of 1932-
1933 in USSR), Vingtième Siècle, No. 88, 2005, pp. 5-22 and Nicolas Werth, “Famines soviétiques,
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way for crucial agricultural progress. Soviet agriculture was also in urgent
need of modernisation, but each Soviet inhabitant could count on an aver-
age of 500 kg of grain annually.
Important though it was, this contrast is no more than a mere difference
in degree when compared with the gulf separating these two countries
from the privileged West, which leads me in conclusion to put forward
two excuses in favour of these regimes that I have quite a bit denigrated.
A similar accelerated development strategy triggered the two famines,
but development itself was an unavoidable choice for each of these two
“backward” countries. The second excuse is much more substantial, and
purports that economic backwardness goes hand-in-hand with the barely
incipient demographic transition of both continental countries. Starting
around 1900 in Russia, and a little later in China, the transition remained
in its initial stage, where fertility remained high while mortality quickly
dropped. It did so more quickly in China, partly because the fight against
infectious diseases had become much more effective the world over by
the 1950s than it had been in the 1920s. Apart from the advantage of
chronological difference, the effective action taken by the Maoist regime
itself had a decisive impact in reducing mortality over the eight years pre-
ceding the disastrous Great Leap. Since birth rates did not drop appreciably
until the 1970s, natural growth continued at a very swift rate of 2 to 2.5%
annually between 1955 and 1957 during this first phase of demographic
transition. The change was slower in the USSR but moved in the same di-
rection, with the birth rate and in particular the death rate clearly higher
than in China a generation later, and a slightly slower but nevertheless
considerable rate of natural growth in the region of 2% annually between
1924 and 1928. The essential factor was the reduction in mortality, which
was less spectacular than in China (a reduction of approximately 10% in
five years from 1924 to 1928, compared with 27% in China from 1953
to 1957) but changed twice as quickly as the reduction in birth rates. Al-
though to a lesser degree than in China, this led to an acceleration in pop-
ulation growth and rural overpopulation that was accentuated under the
New Economic Policy (NEP). By the time Stalin brought this policy to an
end, Russia had 41 million more mouths to feed than at the time of the
1897 census, with a food production system that had barely been im-
proved.
Neither revolutionary state was responsible for a growth in population
that was so difficult to manage; to the extent that they were accountable,
it is to their credit, for they had contributed to a drop in mortality rates. As
long as birth rates failed to track the drop in mortality rates, or in other
words, until the demographic transition had progressed sufficiently to in-
stitute a period of relative stability, the problem of mouths to feed and the
capacity of the agricultural system to rise to this challenge was going to be
a delicate issue. This had been the case in China throughout the first decade
of the regime, and in the USSR to a lesser degree in the 1920s. It was this
precarious foundation that an ill-considered policy caused to shake before
giving way to a criminal policy that transformed crisis into catastrophe. The
huge personal responsibility of the two dictators, against whom the less
stubborn or less cruel national leaders (in the case of China) or regional
leaders (in particular in Ukraine) were unable to mount effective resistance,
called into question, as already mentioned, the Leninist matrix shared by
the two regimes. Though ill-inspired, the power of one imposed itself on all.
z Translated by Will Thornely.
z Lucien Bianco is director of studies emeritus at EHESS (School for
Advanced Studies in Social Sciences), Paris (biancosud@gmail.com).
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